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Abstract: Profit and loss sharing (PLS) based financing without collateral and interest rate could 
ease the financing difficulty of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). However, this PLS based 
financing is not widely offered by Islamic financial institutions (IFIs). This exploratory study 
illustrates that PLS based financing to SMEs is viable for IFIs. Using financial information of SMEs 
to calculate profit sharing ratio and net income under PLS based financing context, this study 
determined the profit margin ratio of IFIs from extending PLS based financing to SMEs. The 
findings show that extending PLS based financing to hypothetical diversified portfolios of SMEs 
generate higher profit margin compared to conventional lending at low risk based on the Markowitz 
portfolio theory of diversification. Moreover, as the number of SMEs in the portfolio increases, the 
risk of insufficient returns from the portfolio when an enterprise suffers a loss reduces.  
Keywords: Profit and loss sharing; SME financing; Islamic financing; diversification 
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1. Introduction  
In Islam, no organization (including IFIs) or individual own any assets in this 
world because the ultimate ownership lies with the one and only Allah. Mankind 
(including IFIs) is only given the responsibility to manage assets according to the 
objective of the Shariah principles (Maqasid al-Shariah) (Al-Ghazali, 1937 as cited 
in Chapra, 1985; Ayub, 2007). Thus, for IFIs, the Shariah principles govern their 
operation, values and philosophy (Lee & Detta, 2007) and unlike conventional 
banks, their main objective goes beyond just wealth maximization. They have 
religious and social obligations to fulfill (Chapra, 1985; Dusuki, 2007). A survey 
on the stakeholders (Shariah advisors, regulators, local communities, customers, 
depositors, employees and managers) of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad and Bank 
Muamalat Malaysia Berhad shows that they share this view of IFIs (Dusuki, 2007).  
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Given that SMEs contribute significantly to the country but had difficulty 
accessing financing from collateral-based conventional financing, IFIs can promote 
socio-economic justice and equitable distribution of wealth by extending financing 
to SMEs. At the same time, social justice in Islamic banking and finance (IBF) also 
means that IFIs should not suffer any injustice by extending financing to SMEs. 
IFIs should profit from extending financing to SMEs.  
There are two types of financing contracts offered by IFIs; profit-sharing contracts 
and sale contracts (Samad, Gardner & Cook, 2005). Profit and loss sharing (PLS) 
based financing could help alleviate SMEs‘ financing constraint. This financing 
mode will allow more SMEs access to finance their activities since the running 
business of the SME itself is the collateral. Unfortunately, PLS based financing 
contracts are less popular compared to sale contracts (Khan, 1995; CIBAFI, 2010a; 
CIBAFI, 2010b; KFH Research Ltd, 2010), particularly for the needy SMEs. 
Amongst reasons for this lack of PLS are higher risk exposure (Fabianto & Kasri, 
2007), information asymmetry problems, agency problems, moral hazard problems 
(Dar & Presley, 2000; Samad et al., 2005; Farooq, 2007) and higher monitoring 
costs (Al-Harran, 1999; Maniam, Bexley & James, 2000; Sarker, 1999). As a 
result, IFIs have been focusing on the needs of corporations and individuals in the 
top third of the economy (Divanna, 2009). However, as these markets are maturing 
and increasingly saturated, IFIs will need to focus on other segments such as the 
vast and profitable SMEs market (Divanna, 2009).  
This study attempts to address the lack of PLS based financing to SMEs by 
applying the Markowitz portfolio theory of diversification to four hypothetical 
portfolios. This study wish to illustrate that IFIs are not worse-off in extending PLS 
based financing to SMEs compared to conventional interest-based lending. IFIs 
perceive the application of this diversification concept as complex (Ascarya, 2009) 
and costly although in actual fact it is much easier and cost-effective.  
 
2. IBF Financing Contracts: Theory and Practice 
Profit-sharing contracts and sale contracts share a few notable characteristics. First, 
there is no interest payment. Second, funds from these contracts cannot be used to 
finance non-permissible (Haram) activities. Third, these contracts ensure that IFIs 
are only rewarded after taking some risks and responsibilities. Fourth, these 
contracts must be just and fair to all parties to the contract (Ayub, 2007). The main 
distinguishing feature between profit sharing contracts and sale contracts is the risk 
sharing attribute in profit sharing contracts.  
In profit sharing contracts, IFIs share the risk of the funded project to share the 
rewards based on a predetermined ratio (profit sharing ratio) of net income from 
the project agreed upon at the beginning of the partnership (Ayub, 2007; Samad et 
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al., 2005). There are two types of profit sharing contracts; mudharabah and 
musyarakah (Samad et al., 2005). Mudharabah is a contract between one party who 
contributes capital (rabbul mal) and another party who provides skill and labour 
(mudarib) (Ismail, 2010). Monetary losses are borne by the rabbul mal while 
mudarib loses time and effort, except when the losses occurred due to breach of 
trust by mudarib (Ismail, 2010). In return, both parties share expected profits at a 
pre-determined ratio (Ismail, 2010). On the other hand, in musyarakah, both parties 
to the contract contribute capital and share expected profit based on capital 
contribution ratio (Ismail, 2010). Both parties have the right to participate in 
management and bear monetary losses (Ismail, 2010). 
For sale contracts, Bay‘ al Murabahah, Bay‘ Bithaman Ajil, and Al- Ijarah are the 
three most popular types of contracts (Samad et al., 2005). Bay‘ al Murabahah is a 
contract between one party (seller) who purchase goods from a supplier on behalf 
of the other party to the contract (buyer) and sell those goods to the buyer at a 
higher price than the cost price. The difference between the selling price and the 
cost price is the profit margin, made known at the beginning of the contract 
(Segrado, 2005). This short term financing facility is a source of working capital 
financing and trade financing (Ismail, 2010). Bay‘ Bithaman Ajil is a contract in 
which one party to the contract (seller) finances the purchase of assets of the other 
party to the contract (buyer) who wish to defer payments for the assets (Ismail, 
2010). The buyer will make deferred installment payment for the asset to the seller 
(Ismail, 2010). The difference between this contract and Bay‘ al Murabahah 
contract is that this contract has a longer time period (medium and long term) thus 
is widely used to finance house purchases in Malaysia (Ismail, 2010). Al- Ijarah, on 
the other hand, is similar to a lease contract.  
In 2009, 40.1% of total assets from IFIs worth USD 748.5 billion are financing 
activities (CIBAFI, 2010b). However, the majority of these financing activities 
(64.7%) were murabahah (CIBAFI, 2010b). In Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) which have the 
largest IFIs in the world, 57.6% of their financing activity were also murabahah 
financing (CIBAFI, 2010a). PLS based financing, although is the ideal financing 
contract, is not widely offered. Only 7.9% and 7.7% of their financing activities 
were mudharabah financing and musharakah financing respectively (CIBAFI, 
2010a). Similar situation can be observed in Malaysia. Figure 1 below illustrates 
that IFIs in Malaysia did not offer much PLS based financing over the past years. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of PLS Based Financing over Total Islamic Financing by 
Malaysian Banking System from Year 2002 to 2010 
Source: Bank Negara Annual Report 2002-2010 
The profit sharing principle (mainly mudharabah and musyarakah financing) 
offered by IFIs was on a decline from 2002 till 2005 but increased from 2005 to 
2010. Despite this increasing trend, the amount of PLS based financing was only 
2.66% of the Islamic financing extended by Islamic banking system in 2010. Bai‘ 
Bithaman Ajil (at 33.73%), ijarah (at 29.80%) and murabahah (at 16.8%) were the 
major financing concepts offered by the banks (KFH Research Ltd, 2010). In 
addition, the Malaysian Islamic financing sector concentrated more on the 
household sector (at 60.8%) for the purchase of passenger vehicles (at 29.5%) and 
residential (at 17.9%) compared to SMEs, probably due to better rewards per unit 
of investment (Bank Negara Annual Report, 2010; KFH Research Ltd, 2010).  
Figure 2 highlight the amount of Islamic financing extended to SMEs and the 
percentage of Islamic financing over total financing extended to SMEs (both 
conventional and Islamic financing) by the Malaysian banking system.  
 
Figure 2. Islamic Financing for SMEs 
Source: Bank Negara Annual Report 2002-2010 
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In Figure 2, there was an upward trend in the amount of Islamic financing extended 
to SMEs from Year 2002 till Year 2006. The highest amount of Islamic financing 
extended was RM 19.4 billion in 2009, five-fold the amount extended in Year 
2002. However, this amount only represents 10.4% of the total financing (both 
conventional and Islamic financing) extended by the banking system to SMEs. The 
remaining 89.6% was conventional financing by the banking system to SMEs. 
Although the amount of Islamic financing extended to SMEs was increasing each 
year, this amount was not even a quarter of the total financing provided to SMEs. 
Based on Figure 1 and 2, one can conclude that PLS based financing to SMEs are 
negligible. This conclusion is consistent with Osman and Ali‘s (2008) findings that 
only 3% of the SMEs respondents utilized mudharabah financing and 4% utilized 
musyarakah financing.  
 
3. Lack of PLS Based Financing: Reasons and Solutions 
An important reason why PLS based financing is not popular among IFIs is the 
lack of qualified personnel in IBF system and Shariah principles (Al-Harran, 1999; 
Sarker, 1999; Maniam et al., 2000). To effectively facilitate IFIs in providing and 
gaining market share in PLS based financing (Maniam et al., 2000), there must be a 
pool of knowledgeable personnel who could appraise, monitor, evaluate and audit 
the proposed projects (Sarker, 1999). As a solution, IFIs can either conduct 
research and development activities that concentrate on project appraisal, 
implementation and follow-up (Khan, 1995) or establish an Islamic consultancy 
house that identifies feasible, profitable projects and educates entrepreneurs in 
project financing (Al-Harran, 1999). 
Next, IFIs do not favour PLS based financing because of the risk sharing attribute 
(Farooq, 2007). However, Fabianto and Kasri (2007) felt that the increased risk 
exposure is the result of discrepancy between theory and practice. Theoretically, 
IFIs should have a well-diversified mixture of assets. For example, short term 
assets (trade financing contracts like murabahah and salam), medium term assets 
(like ijarah and istisna) and long term assets (like musharakah partnership) 
(Fabianto & Kasri, 2007). However, in practice, IFIs have more short term assets 
with less risk (Aggarwal & Yousef, 2000; Fabianto & Kasri, 2007). In addition, 
IFIs should have PLS based contracts as the basis between them and 
investors/depositors so that the pass through mechanism from IFIs to investors/ 
depositors will ensure that any losses from the asset side will also be passed to 
investors/depositors (Sarker, 1999; Fabianto & Kasri, 2007). 
Furthermore, PLS based financing can be in a partnership or equity-financing form, 
both of which are not popular with IFIs and SMEs. Partnership is the least popular 
form of business organization compared to corporation and sole proprietorship 
(Farooq, 2007). A survey showed that 59% of the United States respondents 
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viewed partnership as bad due to conflict of interest, failure of partner to live up to 
expectations and shared control of management and decision making (Caggiano, 
1992 as cited in Farooq, 2007). In PLS based financing, IFIs would prefer to play a 
larger role than just a silent equity investor but SMEs prefer to be the only party 
actively involved in management of the project (Farooq, 2007). Because IFIs could 
not play an active role, this lead to information asymmetry problems, agency 
problems and moral hazard (Dar & Presley, 2000; Samad et al., 2005; Farooq, 
2007). Agency problem stems from the reluctance of the enterprise to report actual 
profit i.e. SMEs may understate profit (Sarker, 1999; Dar & Presley, 2000). If a 
detailed disclosure is made compulsory, the demand for PLS based financing might 
reduce since SMEs are usually reluctant to disclose detailed information about the 
operation and profitability of the business (Sarker, 1999; Samad et al., 2005).  
To overcome these issues, Samad et al. (2005) suggests that IFIs actively 
participate in selecting the Board of Directors that will look out for IFIs‘ interest 
and minimize agency problems. In addition, IFIs should have a concise and clear 
contract that states the limited liability of IFIs to the extent of not exceeding the 
liabilities borne by any partner who had cause the liability in violation of any 
predetermined condition in the contract (Farooq, 2007). The profit sharing ratio 
and status of business assets registered (whether under co-ownership or joint 
ownership) should also be included (Samad et al., 2005). In Malaysia, the contracts 
are comprehensive and concise because IFIs are stringent in extending PLS based 
financing. 
Khan (1995) suggests that IFIs would not require additional monitoring if they 
have an efficient contract. An efficient contract could be achieved by increasing the 
ownership stake of the other party to the contract in order to increase the cost of the 
other party to the same level as the benefits reap from any non-pecuniary benefits 
(Khan, 1995). IFIs could also increase the ratio of profits for the other party if the 
project reports net income above a certain level (Khan, 1995). If IFIs prefer a lower 
cost of additional monitoring, they could observe the performance of another 
project that has similar characteristics with the project funded or through market 
information (Khan, 1995). 
 
4. Methodologies 
This study determined the impact of PLS based financing extended to 30 SMEs out 
of 645 136 SMEs in Malaysia for IFIs (in terms of profit margin) from Year 2002 
to 2010. These SMEs have at least nine years of operation and debt financing from 
financial institutions.  
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4.1 Markowitz Portfolio Theory and Hypothetical Portfolios 
In PLS based financing, the profit of SMEs is shared between IFIs and SMEs based 
on the profit sharing ratio. If the SME makes a loss, IFIs will also yield a loss (i.e. 
zero return) from the PLS contracts. This loss is one of the reasons why IFIs shy 
away from offering PLS based financing to SMEs without any guarantee or 
collateral. The Markowitz portfolio theory suggests portfolio diversification to 
reduce the variance of the portfolio without sacrificing return (Reilly and Norton, 
2006). This diversification effect works best when the securities in the portfolio are 
negatively correlated. The variability of total return from the portfolio reduces.  
This Markowitz portfolio theory can also be applied to loan portfolios of SMEs. To 
apply the insights of this theory, four hypothetical portfolios were created 
consisting of different numbers (five, ten, fifteen and thirty) of SMEs. These 
enterprises are selected from 14 different sectors to manage unique risk associated 
with a particular sector. In theory, Markowitz portfolio theory of diversification 
will result in almost no risk or negligible risk. However, in practical, there will still 
be a considerable amount of risk. This research intends to show that IFIs can make 
sufficient return that more than compensates the risks involved from extending PLS 
based financing to SMEs.  
4.2. Profit Margin of IFIs from PLS Based Financing to SMEs 
This study calculated the profit margin ratio of IFIs to determine the profitability 
from each ringgit extended as PLS based financing to each portfolio. The higher 
the ratio is, the higher the return is to IFIs for each ringgit extended to SMEs. The 
PLS profit margin ratio was compared with conventional lending profit margin 
ratio to determine whether PLS based financing yield higher returns than 
conventional collateral-based lending.  
For PLS based financing, the formula is as follows:  
 
   (1) 
 
where  𝜎is the profit sharing ratio for each SME, NIPLS is the net income in PLS 
context for each SME [both 𝜎 and NIPLS were calculated based on the formula 
shown in Promwichit, Mohamad and Hassan (2013)] and LTD is the long term debt 
from financial institutions for each SME 
Profit margin is calculated by dividing total returns from PLS based financing 
contracts of each portfolio with total amount extended to SMEs as PLS based 
financing contracts. Total returns from extending PLS based financing for each 
portfolio was calculated by summing up the individual returns from each SME in 
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the portfolio. The individual returns from each SME in the portfolio for the IFIs is 
the net income when the SME engage in PLS based financing (instead of debt 
financing), NIPLS distributed to IFIs based on the profit sharing ratio, 𝜎. The profit 
sharing ratio and net income in PLS context for each SME were calculated based 
on the formula shown in Promwichit et al. (2013). The total amount of PLS based 
financing extended to SMEs was assumed to be the total long term debt of all 
SMEs in the portfolio because IFIs are merely extending financing in the form of 
PLS contracts in place of interest-based loans. 
For conventional lending, the profit margin is as follows: 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
where II is the interest income (interest income is paid by SMEs to IFIs hence is 
reported as interest expense in the SME income statement) 
 
5. Results and Discussions 
5.1 Implementation Challenges 
This study shows that IFIs could determine returns from PLS based financing to 
SMEs based on profit sharing ratio. Thus, the calculation of profit sharing ratio is 
very important to IFIs because this ratio will determine the amount of net income 
redistributed between them and SMEs. The higher the ratio, the higher the portion 
of net income redistributed to IFIs and the lower the portion of net income 
redistributed to SMEs. This might provide a motive for SMEs to report a higher 
capital than the actual capital that the enterprise has to reduce the profit sharing 
ratio.  
Thus, the first problem for IFIs is to determine the real amount of capital that each 
SME has. As shown in Promwichit et al. (2013), the profit sharing ratio is 
estimated by taking the sum of SMEs‘ long term borrowings divided by SMEs‘ 
total capital. The long term borrowings are used in the calculation because the 
research assumed that IFIs will offer PLS based financing in place of these debts. 
These figures can be determined directly from the current liabilities and non-
current liabilities section of the balance sheet of the enterprise. Unlike the profit 
sharing ratio that is estimated from published financial information, the value of 
total capital of the SME cannot be determined directly from the balance sheet due 
to unrecorded or undeclared information on hidden liabilities or assets. Hence, the 
calculation requires the judgment of IFIs.  
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The second problem is to determine the actual cause of any losses made by SMEs. 
IFIs receive returns when SME reports a profit but receive no returns when SME 
reports a loss for the financial year. Thus, SMEs may intentionally report a loss to 
avoid distributing net income to IFIs or to increase its personal wealth. Hence, 
when an SME reports a loss for any financial year, IFIs must determine whether 
there is an actual loss. In the event that the enterprise purposely reports a loss, there 
is an automatic correction mechanism in place through the banking system and 
procedures. When IFIs identify that the loss is intentional, IFIs will blacklist the 
enterprise and this will appear in the banking system. Thus, other IFIs will be 
reluctant to extend financing to this enterprise when the enterprise needs financing 
in the future. In short run, IFIs will face a reduction in the revenue from the capital 
extended and incur some additional monitoring costs but in the long run, IFIs 
would not incur any additional monitoring cost to monitor this intentional loss. The 
drawbacks for SMEs to show intentional loss is being blacklisted and denied 
financing in the future. These drawbacks will not compensate for reporting 
intentional loss to avoid distributing profits to IFIs in the short run. Thus, SMEs 
will avoid intentional loss to avoid financing difficulty in the future. 
If SME does make a loss, then IFIs must determine whether the loss was due to 
negligence of the SME. If the loss is due to negligence such as mismanagement, 
SME must be held accountable. In conventional lending, Bank Negara Malaysia 
has established a Small Debt Resolution Scheme (SDRS) to restructure non-
performing loans for viable SMEs in an effort to reduce poor financial management 
of the enterprise (Alhabshi, Khalid & Bardai, 2009). Among poor financial 
management practices include using enterprise‘s money for personal use (Alhabshi 
et al., 2009). Similarly, there must be built-in mechanism for PLS based financing 
for effective regulatory, supervision and enforcement that protects the rights of IFIs 
i.e. the rights to proper disclosure and transparency and the rights to rewards after 
sharing risks with SMEs.  
5.2. Empirical Results  
PLS based financing achieve the just distribution of wealth objective through profit 
sharing ratio that distributes higher share of profits to the party who borne a higher 
liability. Currently, IFIs have determined their share of profits when they enter into 
the agreement, not influenced by the profitability of the SME. First, IFIs calculate 
the expected amount of return from the financing contract and next, they divide 
that predetermined amount by the total expected return of the SME to arrive at the 
profit sharing ratio (Sadique, 2012). In this study, four hypothetical portfolios were 
formed to determine the distribution of profits to IFIs that varies according to the 
profitability of the enterprise. Overall, PLS profit margin ratio was higher 
compared to collateral-based lending profit margin ratio, indicating that returns for 
each ringgit extended under PLS contracts were higher than collateral-based 
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lending. All years (except for certain years), returns from PLS contracts extended 
to each SME were higher than the interest income from loans to each SME.  
Figure 3 illustrates the profit margin ratios for all four portfolios. Out of the four 
portfolios, only the five SMEs portfolio consistently has higher PLS profit margin 
ratios compared to conventional lending profit margin ratios, indicating that returns 
per ringgit extended under PLS based financing was higher than returns per ringgit 
extended as loans for all years.  
 
 
(a) Five SMEs portfolio 
Figure 3. Profit margin ratio for SMEs portfolio 
Unlike the five SMEs portfolio, the ten, fifteen and thirty SMEs portfolios have 
higher PLS profit margin ratios compared to conventional financing profit margin 
ratios from Year 2003 till 2010. In Year 2002, these portfolios have higher returns 
from each ringgit extended as loans. 
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(b) Ten SMEs portfolio 
 
(c) Fifteen SMEs portfolio 
 
(d) Thirty SMEs portfolio 
Figure 3. Profit margin ratio for SMEs portfolio 
In Year 2002, IFIs received lower returns from PLS contracts from a number of 
SMEs in the portfolio due to a low profit sharing ratio and/or reported loss in the 
income statement. First, IFIs have a low profit sharing ratio when an enterprise had 
low debt, usually in the initial few years of operation. As a result, IFIs received a 
lower portion of the net income under PLS based financing when the net income 
was redistributed between IFIs and SME
1
. Second, when an SME made a loss 
under conventional financing, the SME could have profits or losses under PLS 
                                                     
1Amount redistributed to IFIs = Profit sharing ratio x Net income under PLS based financing 
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based financing. If the SME still suffer a loss under PLS based financing, IFIs 
receive zero returns. If the SME is profitable under PLS based financing, IFIs 
receive returns from PLS based financing, although these returns were lower than 
the interest income from loans extended to the SME.  
In Year 2002, IFIs received lower returns from PLS contracts from two SMEs out 
of five SMEs in the five SMEs portfolio. However, the difference between returns 
from PLS contracts and interest income for the remaining three SMEs more than 
offset the huge difference between the returns from PLS contracts and interest 
income for the two less profitable SMEs in the portfolio. When five new SMEs 
were added to the portfolio to form the ten SMEs portfolio, IFIs received lower 
returns from PLS contracts compared to interest income from three out of these 
five new SMEs in Year 2002. Similar situations were reported for the fifteen and 
thirty SMEs portfolios. In the fifteen SMEs portfolio, IFIs received lower returns 
from PLS contracts from seven out of the fifteen SMEs in the portfolio, two of 
which are the new SMEs added to the portfolio. As for the thirty SMEs portfolio, 
IFIs received lower returns from PLS contracts from sixteen SMEs. However, 
higher total returns from PLS contracts compared to the total interest income from 
conventional financing from Year 2003 till 2010 for the ten, fifteen and thirty 
SMEs portfolios had more than compensated for this lower total returns for the 
portfolio in Year 2002.  
Furthermore, increasing the number of SMEs in the portfolio reduces the impact 
that each SME has on the profit margin of the portfolio. To illustrate, in Year 2009, 
seven out of the thirty SMEs in the thirty SMEs portfolio had lower returns from 
PLS contracts compared to the interest income. Despite this situation, IFIs still 
received a higher total returns from PLS contracts compared to total interest 
income for the portfolio, a difference of RM8 576 971. This difference in total 
returns was the biggest difference across all nine years. Even when the PLS profit 
margin ratio decreased in certain years in the five, ten, fifteen and thirty SMEs 
portfolio, these ratios were still higher compared to the corresponding conventional 
lending profit margin ratios. For example, the PLS profit margin ratio for the five 
SMEs portfolio decreased from 13.42% in Year 2009 to 11.42% in Year 2010. 
Hence, IFIs earned about 11 cents for each ringgit extended to SMEs under PLS 
contracts in Year 2010. However, the corresponding conventional lending profit 
margin ratio in Year 2010 was only 6.51%. Thus, financial institutions earned 
about 6 cents from those five enterprises. The difference between the returns per 
ringgit from PLS contracts and returns per ringgit from conventional financing for 
the five SMEs portfolio in Year 2010 is about 5 cents per ringgit. This shows that 
increasing the number of SMEs not only increases returns from PLS contracts but 
also reduces the risk that IFIs will receive a lower returns from these contracts 
compared to loans extended to SMEs when an SME did not perform well for a 
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particular period. Hence, Markowitz portfolio theory does work in this alternative 
mode of financing for portfolios of SMEs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study illustrates that IFIs could profit from PLS based financing 
to SMEs without any collateral in terms of higher returns per ringgit extended. PLS 
based financing will help alleviate financing constraints for SMEs while creating a 
win-win situation for both IFIs and SMEs. As the number of SMEs in the portfolio 
increases, the return of each SME has less impact on the total return of the 
portfolio. The risk of the portfolio is reduced through diversification and IFIs 
would be able to operationalize the PLS contracts without losses. Besides IFIs, 
mutual fund managers can apply this Markowitz portfolio theory of diversification 
to invest in this portfolio of SMEs instead of buying shares of companies.  
In addition, IFIs can provide training to their staff to increase the number of 
knowledgeable personnel to appraise, monitor, evaluate and audit PLS contracts 
(Al-Harran, 1999; Sarker, 1999; Maniam et al., 2000; Ascarya, 2009) since returns 
from PLS based financing extended to a diversified portfolio of SMEs will more 
than cover the cost of training. By improving the infrastructure, IFIs can reduce the 
cost of providing PLS contracts in the long run. Through training too, top 
management of IFIs can improve their understanding about IBF (Ascarya, 2009).  
However, the findings of this study are subjected to some limitations. First, the 
hypothetical portfolios consist of only 30 SMEs. Second, the cost of providing PLS 
based financing is assumed to be similar to the cost of providing debt financing. 
The costs of providing debt financing to SMEs include the cost of organising loan, 
processing loan application, appraisal, processing payment, enquiry and 
maintaining account (Nanda, 1999). There are also service charges and processing 
fees like the reimbursement of actual pocket expenses incurred by IFIs, legal fees 
and stamp duties (Nanda, 1999). However, in reality, IFIs might incur higher costs 
for PLS contracts due to higher human resource management cost, partially 
because of lack of knowledgeable personnel about the IBF and Shariah principles 
to appraise, monitor, evaluate and audit any proposed projects (Al-Harran, 1999; 
Maniam et al., 2000; Ascarya, 2009; Sarker, 1999).  
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